I spent the years, from 74 to 84 as a Security Specialist for Air Force Security Police.. One of the things I learned there was that often times what people said about the need for security was different than what they practiced.. You would hear about Physical Security, Communications Security, and Operational Security. (PhysSec, ComSec, OpSec)
Take one site I was assigned to in Korea, 77-78, the 6903rd SS *part of what was then know as the Air Force Security Service, or USAFSS, when dealt with Electronic Security.. The motto was “In God We Trust, All Others We Monitor”. Sometime you would see an addendum placed behind that “only because we don’t have his frequency”. Our site was located atop a hill on Osan AB. There were huge antennas pointed at North Korea that picked up their communications signal.. What we were told was that “it is not what we do that is classified, it is how well we do it that is classified”. Even they guy from base Civil Engineers, who fixed the A/C at the site, had to have a TS clearance.
Here is where I will tell you about how requirement are often different than reality.. All of the doors of the builder were to be secured, which an electronic lock on the front door.. Anytime a door was opened the Security Detail was supposed to be notified of its opening, and closing. If the roving patrol, on foot, found a door open he would check with the gate, who is the one the people opening the door were supposed to notify so that he could tell the patrol.. Sometimes the Civilian contractors would want to take a break, or just step outside for a few minutes, and so would call the gate… sometime they would forget to lock up when they went back in.. and the patrol would do it.. If it was a case where the gate had not been notified the gate guard would put it in the blotter report, call up the base security patrol and let them know there was an unauthorized door opening. Since the site was considered to be a Priority A security site they would have to up channel a “Helping Hand” report to indicate a possible hostile action.. In this case both Pacific Air Force Command, PacAF, and Air Force Security Service USAFSS at Kelly AFB in Texas would be notified… they had something like 5 minutes from the time of the report to make notifications, then we would have 30 minutes to determine if it was hostile.. So we had 30 minutes to declare the security status.. if it was not hostile we would downgrade to normal, if it was undetermined after that time it was an automatic upgrade to “Covered Wagon”, or possible or actual hostile actions, at which time there would be a base wide alert as security responded to get a better look.
The Reality was that our biggest problem was with the Civilian contractors who ignored our requirement for security, and a Squadron Commander who did not want to make trouble for the contractors.. so we had orders to just put a note in the blotter, and NOT NOTIFY base security control.. This was because there had been a number of time that the base had been up on alert due to some contractor who could not be bothered to let use know when they opened a door, or even lock it up after themselves.. This was only fixed a couple of months before I left when a new squadron commander decided to take this seriously, and I went from one group of contractors to another and pointed out that we would be doing paperwork on these events, and pressing charges.. I also reminded the that the sign on the fence said they could be there “only by permission of installation commander”, which in this case was the Squadron Commander. So, if he declared they were security risk he could bar them from the site, which meant they were of no use to whichever organization had hired them.
When I was stationed at MacDill AFB in Tampa there was a report of a brush fire near the Rapid Deployment Task Force HQ building.. When some of our people got there, along with the Fire Department, they found a 55 gallon oil drum that was on fire. While looking at it the patrols found that it was full of documents, and that some of the burning papers had scattered in the brush, which started the fire. What they found was that many of the papers had. It seems that the shredders at RDJTF had broken down, as well as their furnace, so the had dispatched a crew out to burn said document in the barrel. They had just started the burn and left.
Yes, even in security environments there are lapses, though most of them are unintentional, such as forgetting to lock up a safe for the night, or even forgetting to check a desk drawer when the desk is replaced.. These thing happen.
In the time when Bill Clinton was president there were reports of White House staffers getting waivers for drug testing, something that was required due to their access to classified material..
I am not surprised that Hillary Clinton was one of those people who could not grasp the idea that security has to be taken seriously, or it is worthless.. If you wanted to ever see what class of people the Clintons are just consider the amount of damage, and theft, that was traced back to the staffers as they left the White House..
It is easy to see how, given their backgrounds in shady dealings, that they might not believe that security was that important.. after all look at how she failed to protect the four people who were killed in Libya. As Secretary of State she was their boss and had a responsibility to them, which she failed to fulfill.
There might not have been a law saying that she had to use the State Department servers for her email but, they had trained IT people who would have been able, at the least, to increase the level of the servers security to a level not normally found in a bathroom…
This makes me wonder.. who did her IT security? The plumber?
No… I don’t trust her, and given her history I fail to understand how anyone could.
That Joe Guy.